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Southern Ocean Shakeup:
Establishing Sovereignty in Antarctica
and the Consequences for Fishery
Management
Christina A. Hoefsmit*
INTRODUCTION
Celebrating its 50th anniversary in 2009, the Antarctic
Treaty' has been hailed as a successful model of international
cooperation. 2 Such praise primarily stems from the continued
cooperative governance of Antarctica for peaceful and scientific
purposes, largely preventing Antarctica's disputed territorial
claims from escalating into an international land feud. 3 By
postponing the resolution of territorial claims in Antarctica, the
Antarctic Treaty enabled the establishment of a system of
governance founded on international cooperation. To date, this
system of governance has worked relatively well to prevent
excessive territorial resource exploitation. The same cannot be
said, however, for the exploitation of the continent's aquatic
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2010; Bachelor of
Science, Fisheries & Aquatic Sciences, University of Washington, 2003. The
author wishes to thank her parents, Peter and Barbara, as well as her sister,
Monica, for their unconditional love and support. Special thanks to Professor
Peter Dutton and David Petrarca Jr., for their guidance, constructive
criticism, and editorial assistance.
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
2. Donald K. Anton, False Sanctuary: The Australian Antarctic Whale
Sanctuary and Long-Term Stability in Antarctica, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y 17, 17 (2008).
3. Martin Lishexian Lee, A Case for World Government of the Antarctic,
9 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 73, 75 (2005).
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resources.
The Antarctic Treaty was never intended to govern aquatic
resources; expressly excluding the high seas from its application. 4
With the high seas outside the scope of the Antarctic Treaty, the
regulation of the high seas and its resources fall under the current
system of ocean governance, commonly known as the Law of the
Sea. Under the Law of the Sea, territorial sovereignty is a
necessary predicate for the application of sovereignty and
sovereign rights over adjacent ocean space. 5 The lack of any
territorial sovereignty on the continent of Antarctica precludes the
extension of both sovereignty and sovereign rights over the
adjacent Southern Ocean. 6 Consequently, the high seas begin at
the continent's edge.
The Law of the Sea provides that in the high seas, all States
possess rights collectively referred to as "high seas freedoms."7
Included within these freedoms is the "freedom of fishing," which
grants every State the right of access and exploitation to resources
located on the high seas. 8 With every State possessing the equal
right to exploit high seas resources, the management of those
resources is achievable only through international treaties. Due
to the classification of Antarctica's adjacent ocean space as high
seas, international treaties for the management of Antarctica's
marine living resources - such as the 1972 Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (Seals Convention)9 and the
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR)o - were adopted to address gaps left by the
lack of municipal law. Although CCAMLR established a
comprehensive management regime for Antarctica's marine living
resources, its effectiveness is constrained by the inherent
limitations of international treaties; namely, the inability to
4. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
5. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 2, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
6. Id.
7. Id. at art. 87.
8. Id. at art. 116.
9. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for
signature June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441 [hereinafter Seals Convention].
10. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, opened for signature May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S.
47 [hereinafter CCAMLR].
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enforce treaty provisions against non-party States.11 Lack of
CCAMLR's enforcement against all States participating in
Southern Ocean commercial fisheries has resulted in the
exploitation of fisheries beyond sustainable levels. 12  In the
absence of regulations with greater enforceability, commercial
fisheries in the Southern Ocean are likely to be harvested to the
point of over-exploitation or collapse, threatening the stability of
Antarctica's ecosystem.
This Comment addresses how the lack of territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica has affected the ability to implement
enforceable fishery management measures in the Southern Ocean.
It suggests that the lack of enforceability of international
agreements against non-party States has resulted in the current
regime's ineffectiveness in sustainably managing Antarctica's
marine living resources. It further suggests, at least in the
context of fishery management, that resolving the issue of
sovereignty in Antarctica would greatly improve the effectiveness
of fishery regulation, primarily through strengthening
enforcement measures. Part I of this Comment provides the
context for Antarctic fishery management by briefly describing
Antarctica and the general state of the world's fisheries. Part II
addresses the current management regime of Antarctica - its
history leading up to the current state of affairs. Part III
examines the applicable international instruments governing
fishery resources in the Southern Ocean. Part IV discusses the
establishment of sovereignty in Antarctica, focusing on the
particular form sovereignty would take (a territorial versus an
international regime), as well as the effects of sovereignty on
fishery management. Part V concludes with a discussion of some
of the problems associated with establishing sovereignty in
Antarctica.
I. BACKGROUND
Antarctica's geographic isolation coupled with its harsh
11. See Rachel Baird, Fishing the Southern Ocean: The Development of
Fisheries and the Role of CCAMLR in their Management, 16 U. TAS. L. REV.
160, 168-69 (1997).
12. See id. at 175 (discussing the demise of the N. Rossii stock (fin fish
species) below levels sufficient to sustain an economically viable commercial
fishery).
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climate conditions has, until recently, functioned as a protective
shield, preventing all but the most determined from exploiting the
continent's resources. 13  The advent of new technologies has
brought the ability to overcome the natural obstacles which, until
recently, served as a barrier to the exploration and exploitation of
Antarctica. For example, advances in fishing technologies such as
echosounders, improvements in fishing gear efficiency, mesh size
and bycatch reduction, the development of species and size-
selective commercial fishing methods, as well as improvements in
safety and fuel consumption have expanded the capacity of fishing
fleets. 14 Fishing fleets are no longer geographically restrained,
but are able to travel further afield and capable of withstanding
extreme weather and environmental conditions. 15  Similarly,
advances in technology have provided the capability to extract
previously unreachable resources.16 Add to the mix the increasing
scarcity of natural resources and an estimated world population of
over 6.7 billion, 17 and Antarctica is rapidly gaining attention as an
untapped source of minerals, fuel energy, food and fresh water.18
Currently, the state of the world's fisheries indicates a fishing
crisis: only 25% percent of fish stocks are harvested within their
sustainable limits. 19 The remaining 75% percent of fish stocks are
fully exploited, overexploited or depleted.20 The status of fisheries
13. Philip Bender, A State of Necessity: IUU Fishing in the CCAMLR
Zone, 13 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 233, 233 (2008).
14. Stephen J. Walsh et al., Improving Fishing Technology to Catch (of
Conserve) More Fish: the Evolution of the ICES Fishing Technology and Fish
Behavior Working Group During the Past Century, 1-6 (2000), available at
http://wgftfb.org/publications/history html files/history.pdf. See also ELLIOTT
A. NORSE ET AL., Place-Based Ecosystem Management in the Open Ocean, in
MARINE CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 302, 315 (Elliott A. Norse & Larry B.
Crowder, eds., 2005).
15. See NORSE ET AL., supra note 14, at 315.
16. Allan Young, Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction and the Law of
the Sea: A Question of Compromise, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 46 (1985).
17. Estimated world population for 2009. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
(expand the "People" menu) (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
18. Young, supra note 16, at 45.
19. U.N. FOOD & AGRIc. ORG. (FAO), THE STATE OF THE WORLD FISHERIES
AND AQUACULTURE 29 (FAO Fisheries & Agric. Dept. ed., 2007), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/AO699e/AO699e00.htm [hereinafter FAO].
20. Id. Fully exploited fish stocks are stocks currently harvested at a
maximum level that sustains their population. See Katrina M. Wyman, The
Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 524
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in the Southern Ocean 21 is only slightly better, with 60% of the
fish stocks either fully or overexploited. 22  While total fish
production has increased to 142 million tonnes annually, 23 the
amount of fish biomaSs24 in the world's oceans has decreased
significantly. 25 The resulting problem is increased fishing effort
for fewer fish.
Comprising 8% of the world's ocean space26 and having one of
the world's highest concentrations of life, the Southern Ocean has
a long history of exploitation beginning in 1790 with the
harvesting of seals.27 By 1825, seal populations in the Southern
Ocean had been harvested to near extinction. 28 From 1825 to
present, the sealing industry enjoyed only minor revivals with the
last known substantial harvest occurring during 1983-1984
fishing season. 29 To date, seal populations are increasing with
(2008). Overexploited and depleted stocks refer to fisheries that either are or
have been harvested at a level that prevents them from sustaining their
population. Id.
21. For the purpose of this Comment, the Southern Ocean is defined as
the area south of 600 South latitude in accordance with Article I of CCAMLR.
CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. I.
22. Serge M. Garcia et al., Global Trends in the State of Marine Fisheries
Resources 1974-2004, in FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 457 REVIEW OF THE
STATE OF WORLD MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES, figure A2.2 (FAO Fisheries ed.,
2005), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/y5852e/Y5852EO2.htm#chl.
23. FAO, supra note 19, at 3.
24. Biomass is defined as the total quantity or weight of organisms in a
given area or volume. OXFORD ESSENTIAL DICTIONARY 57 (Berkley 1998).
25. See Jorge Csirke, Global Production and State of Marine Fishery
Resources, in FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 457 REVIEW OF THE STATE OF
WORLD MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES, 6 (FAO Fisheries ed., 2005), available
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/y5852e/Y5852EO2.htm#chl.1. A 10-year
study indicates that over the last 50 years, the biomass of large predatory
fish has decreased by 90%. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Kelly E. Siman-
Sovacool, Creating Legal Teeth for Toothfish: Using the Market to Protect Fish
Stocks in Antarctica, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 15, 16 (2008). A recent estimate places
the world's fish biomass at two billion tonnes. Press Release, University of
British Columbia, UBC Researcher Gives First-Ever Estimate of Worldwide
Fish Biomass and Impact on Climate Change (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.publicaffairs.ubc.calmedia/releases/2009/mr-09-005.html.
26. GEORGE A. KNOX, BIOLOGY OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN 476 (2d ed. 2007).
27. Ross Shotton, Southern Ocean FAO Statistical Areas 48, 58 and 88,
in FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 457 REVIEW OF THE STATE OF WORLD
MARINE FISHERY RESOURCES, 1 3 (FAO Fisheries ed., 2005), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/y5852efY5852EO7.htm#ch2.17.
28. Id.
29. KNOX, supra note 26, at 458-59.
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some areas supporting population levels that are thought to be 78-
94% greater than historic levels. 30 Whaling began in the region in
1904 and continued until 1987 with the enactment of the
moratorium on whaling.3 1 The close of the sealing industry
coupled with the whaling moratorium has allowed Antarctica's
marine mammal populations to begin recovering from the heavy
exploitation pressures that once existed.32
Commercial fishing in the Southern Ocean is a relatively
recent development. 33  Attempts to exploit Antarctic fish
populations date back to the 1900s; however, successful large-
scale commercial fisheries did not develop until the late 1960s. 34
Of the 270 fish species known to inhabit the Southern Ocean, only
twelve are or have been commercially exploited. Past
commercially exploited fish species include lanternfish, mackerel
icefish, marbled rockcod, and Patagonian rockcod. 35 However, the
majority of these species have been intensely overfished to the
point where commercial fisheries are no longer viable.36 At
present, the most lucrative fishery within the Southern Ocean is
the Patagonian toothfish,37 which in the 2004 fishing season
comprised 63% percent of the catch by weight. 38  To date,
approximately nine million tonnes of fish and krill have been
30. Dominic A. Hodson and Nadine M. Johnston, Inferring Seal
Populations From Lake Sediments, 387 NATURE 30, 30-31 (1997).
31. Shotton, supra note 27, at 3, 9. The International Whaling
Commission (IWC) governs the conservation of whales and enacted a
moratorium on whale harvesting in 1986 due to the lack of scientific certainty
of whale stocks. International Whaling Commission (IWC),
http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/iwcmain.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
32. See KNox, supra note 26, at 459, 465.
33. Karul-Hermann Knock et al., Fisheries in the Southern Ocean: An
Ecosystem Approach, 362 PHILOS. TRANS. R. Soc. B 2333, 2334-2335 (2007).
Commercial fishing in the Southern Ocean did not start until the late 1960s,
and krill harvesting is even more recent, not having started until 1970s. Id.
34. See KNox, supra note 26, at 454-55.
35. Id. at 455.
36. Id.
37. Patagonian Toothfish refers to Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus
eleginoides) and Antarctic Toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni), both of which
are commercially fished and marketed as Chilean Sea Bass. Kevin W.
Riddle, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International
Cooperation Contagious?, 37 ODIL 265, 267 (2006); Sovacool & Siman-
Sovacool, supra note 25, at 16-17.
38. Shotton, supra note 27, at 5.
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA
harvested. 39
The extreme environmental conditions of Antarctica and the
Southern Ocean have influenced the ability of Antarctic fish
species to recover from commercial exploitation. 40 Characteristics
such as late age of sexual maturity and low growth rates have
increased their susceptibility to overfishing, even at levels of low
fishing activity. 41 As a result, fish not having reached sexual
maturity tend to comprise a significant portion of the commercial
catch, leading to the phenomenon of recruitment overfishing. 42
Recruitment overfishing occurs when the rate of fishing has
depleted the stock to the point where the number of fish reaching
sexual maturity is depressed such that the reproduction capacity
of the stock is unable to keep up with the fishing pressure. 43 Over
time, recruitment overfishing inhibits the ability of fish
populations to recover from exploitation and eventually leads to
collapse.44
The current management regime for marine living resources
in the Southern Ocean is the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).45 CCAMLR, as an
international treaty, is limited in the enforcement of its
provisions. Its ability to enforce regulations regarding the
management of Antarctica's marine living resources is restricted
to only those States actually party to CCAMLR.46 States not
39. Id.
40. See Jennifer Angelini & Andrew Mansfield, Comment, A Call for U.S.
Ratification of the Protocol on Antarctic Environmental Protection, 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 163, 170 (1994). The slow maturity of Antarctic marine species
due to cold water temperatures increases the time needed for commercially
exploited stocks to recover.
41. KNoX, supra note 26, at 457.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Charles H. Peterson, Recruitment Overfishing in a Bivalve Mollusc
Fishery: Hard Clams (Mercenaria mercenaria) in North Carolina, 59 CAN. J.
FISH. AQUAT. Sci. 96, 96 (2002).
45. Andrew Clarke and Colin Harris, Polar Marine Ecosystems: Major
Threats and Future Change, 30 ENVIR. CONS. 1, 18 (2003). A more detailed
discussion of CCAMLR is provided in Part II(B) of this Comment.
46. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
(discussing international treaties generally and how treaties that are in force
are binding upon only the parties to it).
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party to CCAMLR are able to disregard CCAMLR's regulations
when exploiting Antarctica's marine living resources. 47 Given
that the high seas is, by definition, an area of open access where
all States have a right to resources contained within,48 States
exploiting marine living resources in the Southern Ocean are not
necessarily party to CCAMLR. In fact, a number of States
participating in the commercial exploitation of the Southern
Ocean have not signed onto CCAMLR and are thus not bound by
its regulations.49 Inability to enforce CCAMLR against all users
of Antarctica's marine living resources has created a need for a
regulatory framework with enforcement capability against all
States engaged in the exploitation of Antarctica's marine living
resources.
II. CURRENT MANAGEMENT REGIME
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are managed through an
intricate network of international treaties and agreements. In
exploring the relationship among sovereignty, enforcement and
fisheries management within Antarctica, this Comment focuses on
those instruments that affect the ability to sustainably manage
fisheries in the Southern Ocean, namely, the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)50 and the various
treaties and agreements comprising the Antarctic Treaty System
(ATS).
The Antarctic Treaty is the bedrock of Antarctica's current
management regime. 51 It details the mechanisms that currently
govern Antarctica, but is limited in its application to terrestrial
matters. 52  The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) is the Antarctic Treaty's
marine counterpart. It regulates Antarctica's marine living
resources, exclusive of whales and seals, which are covered under
47. See id.
48. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 87.
49. See Australian Antarctic Division, CCAMLR Continues Efforts to
Protect Toothfish, http://www.aad.gov.aul default.asp?casid=2051 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2010).
50. UNCLOS, supra note 5.
51. See Steve T. Madsen, Comment, A Certain False Security: The
Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
458, 459-60 (1993).
52. See generally Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
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separate international agreements. 53 Together, the Antarctic
Treaty and CCAMLR comprise a complementary resource
regulation regime; the Antarctic Treaty regulating terrestrial
resources on the Antarctic continent 54 and CCAMLR regulating
the marine resources in the Southern Ocean.55
UNCLOS is a separate international treaty detailing the
current system of ocean governance.5 6  UNCLOS essentially
divides the world's oceans into different zones with each zone
categorized by the degree of sovereign rights a coastal State can
exert.57  UNCLOS delineates seven zones: internal waters,
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, archipelagic waters, the
economic exclusive zone (EEZ), the continental shelf, and the high
seas. 58 In all zones except the high seas, a coastal State can
exercise some degree of sovereign rights.59 The lack of a coastal
State's ability to exercise sovereign rights over the high seas60 in
effect creates an ocean "commons" with all States possessing the
right to use and exploit the resources contained therein.6 1
A. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)
ATS is comprised of six instruments,62 the cornerstone of
53. CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. VI. The management of Antarctica's
seals is regulated under the Seals Convention while the management of
whaling is regulated by the International Whaling Commission. See
generally Seals Convention, supra note 9; IWC, supra note 30.
54. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
55. See CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art I.
56. See Peter Prows, Tough Love:The Dramatic Birth and Looming
Demise of UNCLOS Property Law (and What is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 241, 243 (2007).
57. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 5.
58. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 8 (internal waters), art. 2-4
(territorial sea), art. 33 (contiguous zone), art. 49 (archipelagic waters), art.
55-57 (EEZ), art. 76-78 (continental shelf) and art. 86-90 (high seas).
59. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 5.
60. Id. at art. 89.
61. See id. at art. 87. For a detailed analysis of the impacts associated
with a shared limited resource, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243-1248 (1968), available at dieoff.org/page95.htm.
62. See Sovacool & Siman-Sovacool, supra note 25, at 21-22. Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 2; the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora (effective Sep 1, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 991 [hereinafter
Agreed Measures]); the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals, supra note 9; the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources, supra note 10; 1988 Convention for the Regulation
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which is the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in
1961.63 The Antarctic Treaty is essentially a by-product of
international tensions stemming from the political climate at the
time: the Cold War.64 The international consensus of Antarctica
as terra nullius - land owned by no-one - opened the continent
to an international land grab as various States asserted territorial
claims over portions of Antarctica.65 Britain asserted the first
formal claim to Antarctica, first for itself, and later on behalf of its
colonies, New Zealand and Australia. 66 France, without setting
foot on the continent, followed suit by claiming Terre Ad6lie.67
Norway, fearing a competing claim by Germany, claimed
Dronning Maud Land.68 Argentina and Chile each asserted
claims based on various principles, including, geographical
contiguity and the right of legal inheritance from Spain.69 Japan,
in response to Chile's claim, formally reserved rights in
Antarctica, and both the United States and the former Soviet
Union (now Russia) refused to recognize the various land claims,
while at the same time reserving the right to make claims of their
own. 70 Competing land claims, the Cold War, and the successful
scientific cooperation in Antarctica in the wake of the
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (opened for signature June 2, 1988,
27 I.L.M. 868 [hereinafter CRAMRA]), and the 1991 Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1455 (1991) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]). CRAMRA is legally dead due to
its rejection by Australia and France in 1989. Angelini & Mansfield, supra
note 40, at 192; see also Madsen, supra note 51, at 464. The regulation of
mineral exploitation has since been addressed in articles VII and XXV of the
Madrid Protocol placing a prohibition on mineral exploitation. Madrid
Protocol, supra note 62.
63. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
64. Lee, supra note 3, at 75; Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 40, at 182.
65. See LORRAINE M. ELLIOT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
PROTECTING THE ANTARCTIC 26 (St. Martin's Press 1994).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 26-27. Terre Ad6lie, which is in the southeast part of East
Antarctica, is the name of the section of Antarctica claimed by France.
68. Id. at 27. Dronning Maud Land is the name of the section of
Antarctica claimed by Norway, which is in the northern portion of Antarctica.
69. Id. Both Chile and Argentina maintain claims to Antarctica based on
historic right, contiguity and proximity, geological affinity, and Pan-
American primacy. See Patrick Bergin, Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty
Regime, and Legal and Geopolitical Implications of Natural Resource
Exploration and Exploitation, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-13 (1988).
70. ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 27.
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International Geophysical Year (IGY)71 together formed the
catalyst for the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. 72
At its core, the Antarctic Treaty revolves around three
principles: (1) the suspension of territorial claims, (2)
international scientific cooperation, and (3) the use of Antarctica
for peaceful purposes. 73 The treaty established Antarctica as a
neutral continent where the interests of science prevail. Its
provisions on the prohibition of military use and nuclear activities
effectively transformed Antarctica into the first nuclear-free
zone. 74 The Antarctic Treaty takes no position as to the validity of
States' territorial claims.75  Instead, it freezes all territorial
claims, 76 leaving unresolved the issue of sovereignty in Antarctica.
To date, the Antarctic Treaty has been considered successful in its
governance of Antarctica.77  However, increasing economic
pressures to exploit Antarctica's potential resources may strain
the status quo to the point where the resolution of territorial
claims becomes necessary.
The Antarctic Treaty, in theory, is an open membership
agreement. Under Article XIII, any member State of the United
Nations may accede to the treaty, and any non-United Nations
member State may accede upon invitation by the Contracting
Parties (those States party to the Antarctic Treaty).78 For the
purposes of decision making, membership is divided into two
categories: States with Consultative Party status and those with
Non-Consultative Party status.79 Of the forty-nine States that
have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, twenty-eight have
71. The International Geophysical Year (IGY) was designed to facilitate
cooperation among States using the medium of science. From July 1957 -
December 1958, a total of twelve States participated in scientific research
aimed at observing various geophysical phenomena with a particular
emphasis on Antarctica. See id. at 30; Bergin, supra note 69, at 19-20.
72. See ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 30-32.
73. See id. at 35-36.
74. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. I, art. V.
75. See generally id.
76. Id. at art. IV.
77. See Marie Jacobsson, The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and
Environmental Issues - Future Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty System, in
ANTARCTICA: LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 1, 3
(Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds., 2007).
78. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IV.
79. Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 40, at 183.
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Consultative Party status and the remaining nineteen have Non-
Consultative Party status.80 In order to achieve Consultative
Party status, and thus participate in decision making, a
Contracting State must maintain "substantial scientific research
activity" in Antarctica. 81 States acceding to the Antarctic Treaty
but not meeting the "substantial scientific research activity"
requirement -are automatically granted Non-Consultative Party
status and are unable to vote on recommendations affecting the
governance of Antarctica. 82
This two-tiered membership system effectively limits
participation in the governance of Antarctica to States wealthy
enough to finance scientific research in Antarctica. As a result, a
growing number of States, especially those in the developing
world, view the Antarctic Treaty as creating an elite "club,"
managing Antarctica's resources for its exclusive benefit;83
resources the developing world views as belonging to the
international community. The view of the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Party members as an elite club has resulted in the
refusal by nearly all States to recognize any territorial claims to
Antarctica. 84 In addition, there is mounting pressure to designate
Antarctica as a "common heritage of mankind" and manage it
under a separate authority. 85
Two issues absent from the Antarctic Treaty, but
subsequently addressed in later-enacted instruments, were
80. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, Antarctic Treaty Fact Sheet, http://www.atcm2009.gov/c26719.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
81. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX; Angelini & Mansfield,
supra note 40, at 184. Unanimous decisions are required for
recommendations to become binding on both Consultative and Non-
Consultative parties. Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 40, at 184. India has
effectively blocked all recommendations from 1983 to present from coming
into force by not ratifying any recommendations since attaining Consultative
status in 1983. Id.
82. See ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 39.
83. See id. at 48.
84. See Jennifer Frakes, Comment, The Common Heritage of Mankind
Principle and the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica: Will Developed
and Developing Nations Reach a Compromise?, 21 Vis. INT'L L.J. 409, 430
(2003).
85. See Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 109, 114 (2009).
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resource exploitation and environmental protection. 86 At the time
of its creation, the Antarctic Treaty was viewed primarily as a
security agreement by the signatory States to prevent
international conflict form erupting in Antarctica. 87 Resource
exploitation and environmental protections took a back seat and
were not substantively addressed. Over time, implementation of
the Antarctic Treaty led to the realization that certain issues were
either not covered as thoroughly as previously thought or not
covered at all. As a result, several agreements covering various
issues, including environmental protection and resource
exploitation, have since been ratified or enacted under the
Antarctic Treaty such as CCAMLR88 and the Madrid Protocol.89
Of the various agreements that addressed resource exploitation,
this Comment focuses on CCAMLR, which established the
regulatory framework for the management of fish stocks in
Antarctica. 90
B. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR)
CCAMLR is the primary instrument under which fisheries in
the Southern Ocean are managed. 91 Entering into force in 1982,
CCAMLR is technically part of the Antarctic Treaty System
(ATS).92 CCAMLR, however, is also a separate international
treaty.93 As such, membership is not restricted to those States
that are party to the Antarctic Treaty.94 To date, thirty-four
States have acceded to CCAMLR.95
86. See id. at 41.
87. See Lee, supra note 3, at 75. See also Bergin, supra note 69, at 3-4.
88. See CCAMLR, supra note 10 (establishing a framework for the
regulation of Antarctica's marine living resources).
89. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 62 (establishing provision for the
environmental protection of Antarctica).
90. CCAMLR, supra note 10.
91. Clarke & Harris, supra note 45.
92. See Sovacool & Siman-Sovacool, supra note 25, at 21-22.
93. See id. (discussing how the ATS is comprised of several specific
agreements, one of which is CCAMLR).
94. CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. III.
95. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
People's Republic of China, Cook Islands, European Community, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mauritius,
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South
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CCAMLR applies to all areas south of 600S latitude as well as
those areas north of 60'S latitude within the Antarctic
Convergence - a circumpolar curve where the cold waters of the
Southern Ocean mix with the warmer waters of the sub-
Antarctic. 96 In contrast, the Antarctic Treaty by definition only
applies to land; it expressly prohibits application to the high seas
located south of 601S latitude.97 Thus, CCAMLR tends to be
viewed as a counterpart to the Antarctic Treaty, regulating
marine living resources that fall outside the Antarctic Treaty's
coverage area.
CCAMLR was enacted in response to concerns about the
overfishing of finfish stocks as well as the effects an expanding
krill fishery would have on the Southern Ocean ecosystem. 98
Krill, tiny shrimplike crustaceans, are of particular importance
because they form the basis of the Antarctic food web.99 All
species in Antarctica depend either directly or indirectly on krill
for survival, making the sustainable management of a krill fishery
essential for the continued existence of Antarctica's ecosystem.100
CCAMLR was thus enacted with the unique goal of "safeguarding
. . . the integrity of the ecosystem of the seas surrounding
Antarctica."101 To that end, CCMALR established a regulatory
framework utilizing an ecosystem approach in the management,
conservation and sustainable utilization of krill and other
Antarctic marine living resources. 102 It recognizes the inherent
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America,
Uruguay, and Vanuatu. See CCAMLR website, http://www.ccamlr.org/pule/
ms/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
96. See Shotton, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the seasonally variation
of the Antarctic Convergence's boundary); Bender, supra note 13, at 234
(discussing CCAMLR's application to those areas of ocean space between
60*S latitude and the Antarctic Convergence). See also CCAMLR, supra note
10, at art. I (geographic coordinates establishing an approximation of the
Antarctic Convergence).
97. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty expressly prohibits application to
areas designated high seas and within 60* South latitude, the area
encompassed by the treaty. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
98. KNox, supra note 26, at 475.
99. Philip Bender, The Precautionary Approach and Management of the
Antarctic Krill, 18 J. ENVrL. L 229, 229 (2006).
100. Id.
101. CCAMLR, supra note 10, at para. 1.
102. KNox, supra note 26, at 476. CCAMLR expressly excludes regulation
of seals and whales, both of which are regulated by their respective
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interdependencies between various marine species, and that the
ability to maintain a functioning and productive Southern Ocean
is dependent on the management of the ecosystem as a whole,
rather than on the management of discrete individual marine
species. 103
Conservation, under CCAMLR, includes the concept of
"rational use" which provides for the exploitation of marine living
resources, but only to the extent that their population levels are
sustainable. 104 Thus, CCAMLR essentially functions as a regional
fisheries management organization tasked with striking a balance
between the competing ideologies of conservation and
exploitation. 0 5  The Commission, the decision-making body
charged with implementing policies and procedures in furtherance
of CCAMLR,106 has adopted over 200 measures aimed at the
protection of Antarctica's marine living resources. 107  These
measures have imposed constraints on both the harvesting of
specific marine species as well as fishery practices, and have
included such measures as gear restrictions, implementation of
catch limits, vessel licensing systems, vessel monitoring systems,
catch documentation schemes, as well as area and seasonal
closures.10
Similar to the Antarctic Treaty, which makes no claim on the
territory of Antarctica, CCAMLR makes no possessory claim on
the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean. 109 It only
establishes a system under which management of those resources
conventions-the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals and the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. See CCAMLR
website, http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/gen-intro.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2010).
103. See Alan Brown, Some Current Issues Facing the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), in
ANTARCTICA LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 88, 91
(Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds., 2007); see also Stuart Kaye, IUU Fishing
in the Southern Ocean: Challenge and Response, in ANTARCTICA LEGAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 39, 51 (Gillian Triggs & Anna
Riddell, eds., 2007).
104. CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. II.
105. Bender, supra note 13, at 235.
106. Id.
107. Brown, supra note 103, at 85.
108. See id. at 97-98; see also Kaye, supra note 103, at 51.
109. Brown, supra note 103, at 91.
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is achieved through the cooperation and participation of those
States interested in exploiting the resources. 110 Consequently,
the success of CCAMLR (i.e. effectively managing the marine
living resources of the Antarctic) is dependent on the goodwill of
its members. CCAMLR's effectiveness faces severe challenges
from States not party to the treaty (non-party States) as well as
from illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.111
C. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
codified the majority of customary international law as it relates
to the oceans. 112 It established a comprehensive regime governing
the world's oceans; specifically, it created a fair and "equitable
international economic order" over ocean space.113 Hailed as the
"[c]onstitution for the [o]ceans,"114 UNCLOS contains 320 articles
and nine annexes addressing issues such as commercial activities,
environmental protection, scientific research, dispute resolution,
and the extent of sovereignty and sovereign rights.115 With 157
States currently party to UNCLOS,116 its acceptance by the
international community as a regulatory framework for the oceans
is firmly established.
The need for a comprehensive ocean management regime was
not recognized until the mid-twentieth century. Up to that point,
the view advocated by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his seminal
work Mare Liberum governed.11 7 Mare Liberum advanced the
110. See CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. IX.
111. See Bender, supra note 13, at 233.
112. See Young, supra note 16, at 59-60.
113. U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of
Legal Affairs, THE LAW OF THE SEA at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.10 (2001).
114. Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Remarks, 'A Constitution for the Oceans' (Dec 6 & 11, 1982),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/koh
english.pdf.
115. See UNCLOS, supra note 5.
116. Ocean & Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm
(follow the "United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea" and then follow
"chronological list of ratifications/accession/successions/" hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 21, 2010).
117. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius advocated the concept of res
communis-oceans as an open access resource under which anyone could
exercise the right of fishing-to justify the Dutch East India Company's trade
routes in the Far East, in spite of Portugal's existing maritime claims in the
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view of an open ocean; oceans were considered res communis,
freely accessable to all and incapable of being enclosed by any
State.118 Sovereignty over ocean space was non-existant except
for the territorial sea, a three nautical mile (nm) band of ocean
space directly adjacent to a State's coastline.119 The concept of res
communis sufficed while fish stocks were thought to be
inexhaustible and only a few States had extensive maritime
capabilities.120  With the increase in worldwide fishing and
advances in technology, however, it became increasingly apparent
that the concept of res communis and the framework of ocean
governance that had developed around it were insufficient to deal
with the evolving and competing uses of ocean space.121
UNCLOS differs from Grotius's Mare Liberum by zoning the
ocean; it divides the ocean into differing zones, each distinguished
by the degree of sovereign rights a coastal State may exercise. 122
Many of the UNCLOS zones overlap or encompass other zones.123
The degree of sovereign rights a coastal State enjoys is inversely
related to distance with sovereign rights decreasing the further
seaward one is from land. For purposes of this Comment, only the
economic exclusive zone (EEZ) is material to fishery management.
The EEZ, however, completely encompasses two other zones, the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Each of these zones is
defined in order to provide a broader understanding of UNCLOS:
The territorial sea extends 12 nm from the baseline and is
essentially viewed as an extension of the coastal State and is
subject to the coastal State's sovereignty;124
The contiguous zone extends to a maximum of 24 nm from the
baseline and the exercise of sovereign rights is limited to the
extent necessary to prevent infringement of the coastal State's
"customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;"125 and
region. See Prows, supra note 56, at 249-50.
118. See id. at 250.
119. See generally id. at 251.
120. See id. at 248.
121. See id.
122. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 5.
123. See UNCLOS, supra note 5.
124. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 2-3.
125. Id. at art. 33.
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The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends to a maximum of
200 nm from the baseline,126 within which the exercise of
sovereign rights is limited to the "purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources,
whether living or non-living" within the water, seabed and subsoil
"and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone . . . ."127
The remaining ocean space seaward of the EEZ is designated
as the "high seas." 128 UNCLOS's definition of the high seas is an
exclusive definition, defining the high seas by what they are not
rather than by what they are. 129 Under Article 86, the rules of
the high seas apply to "all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State . . . ."130 Ocean space characterized as
high seas is defined by the principle of open access; 131 all States
are free to use the high seas, however, none may subject any part
of the high seas to its sovereignty.132
UNCLOS's demarcation of ocean space creates a gradation of
a coastal State's sovereign rights; sovereign rights diminish the
further seaward one travels, eventually extinguishing at the EEZ
boundary, 200 nm from the baseline. 133 The degree of sovereign
rights a coastal State possesses determines the amount of control
a State can exert on the management of fish stocks occurring
within its EEZ. A coastal State possesses exclusive management
over those stocks occurring within its EEZ.134 Fishing fleets,
domestic and international, must abide by the fishery regulations
126. Id. at art 57.
127. Id. at art. 56.
128. See id. at art. 86.
129. Id.
130. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 86.
131. See id. at art. 87-90. Grotius' concept of res communis-an open ocean
with access by all-is now only applicable to the high seas. All other zones of
jurisdiction as defined in UNCLOS retain some restraint on use by the
coastal state. See supra text accompanying notes 119-122.
132. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 204 (3d ed. 1999)
(1983).
133. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 57. Boundaries with the
continental shelf which has the potential to extend a coastal State's
jurisdiction beyond 200 nm are not considered in this Comment.
134. Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas
Fisheries After Grotius - Towards A New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 645, 673 (2004); UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 56.
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established by the coastal State.135 While this puts the success of
management on the coastal State for those stocks contained
within its EEZ, many fish species, including a majority of
commercially viable species, do not observe political and
geographical boundaries due to their migratory nature. As a
result, the management of highly migratory species' 36 and
straddling stocks137 is dependent on international cooperation in
accordance with the provisions in UNCLOS.
III. FISHERY MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CURRENT REGIME
The effective management of fisheries in the Southern Ocean
suffers from several consequences of the current Antarctic Treaty
regime. Lack of effective enforcement measures is the crucial
problem. As previously discussed, the Antarctic Treaty suspends
all territorial claims, effectively leaving Antarctica devoid of
sovereignty.13 8  Under UNCLOS, territorial sovereignty is a
necessary prerequisite for the establishment of limited jurisdiction
over adjacent ocean space.139 Antarctica's lack of sovereignty
prevents the extension of sovereign rights over the adjacent ocean
space in accordance with UNCLOS, which in turn prevents the
establishment of an Antarctic EEZ. Without an EEZ, fishing
fleets are not required to comply with any promulgated fishing
regulations, unless the State under which the vessel operates is a
party to the agreements establishing fishing regulations.140 In
135. As a result of coastal States retaining jurisdiction over natural
resources in their EEZ, domestic vessels must abide by the regulations
promulgated by the coastal State. In addition, since the EEZ is recognized
under both UNCLOS and customary international law, international vessels
are obligated to abide by the regulations as well while within the EEZ. See
UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 58.
136. Highly migratory species are those species that travel through
several EEZs and the high seas. OCED Glossary of Statistical Terms,
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/index.htm. (search for "highly migratory
species") (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 64.
137. Straddling stocks are defined as stocks of the same or associated
species that occur either within the EEZ of two or more coastal states or
occur both within the EEZ and in the area beyond and adjacent to it
(essentially the high seas). UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 63.
138. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 3, at 78;
Angelini & Mansfield, supra note 40, at 182; Young, supra note 16, at 48.
139. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 2.
140. See id. at art. 116.
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the absence of the ability to delineate an EEZ, and any other
UNCLOS zone, the entire Southern Ocean from the edge of the
Antarctic continent seaward is classified as high seas. 14 1
Classifying ocean space as high seas creates certain
internationally recognized rights, termed high seas freedoms,
which all States enjoy. 142 One particular freedom, the freedom of
fishing, allows any State to exploit the marine living resources
contained within the high seas. 143 The freedom of fishing is
conditioned on States exercising "due regard for the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas . . .
."144 However, what responsibilities this provision actually places
on States is far from clear. The inability to claim an Antarctic
EEZ, coupled with the high seas classification of the Southern
Ocean, restricts management of fish stocks to international
treaties such as CCAMLR.145
International treaties, however, are an inherently weak form
of management because they invariably require a balance of
cooperation, compliance, enforcement and self-policing.146 In an
effort to obtain agreement from a majority of States, compromises
are struck, often decreasing the effectiveness of the treaty.147
CCAMLR is no exception, with evidence of compromise illustrated
by the inclusion of an opt-out clause.148 Opt-out clauses provide
States with a way to avoid obligations previously agreed to under
a treaty. In the context of CCAMLR, the opt-out clause permits
non-compliance with a Convention Measure by a State when,
within 90 days of the adoption of the measure, the State formally
claims an "inability to accept the measure" for any reason.149 The
presence of this opt-out clause preserves the possibility of a
complete evisceration of CCAMLR's management of Antarctica's
141. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 86.
142. Id. at art. 87.
143. Gorina-Ysern, supra note 134, at 675; UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art.
116.
144. UNCLOS supra note 5, at art. 87 para. 2.
145. See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 134, at 675.
146. See David Freestone, A Decade of the Law of the Sea Convention: Is it
a Success?, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 499, 501 (2007) (discussing UNCLOS
as a compromise that left issues unresolved in an effort to produce a treaty
that would gain support from a majority of States).
147. Id.
148. See Baird, supra note 11, at 173.
149. Id.
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marine living resources. Should a significant number of party
States begin utilizing this exception, management of marine living
resources will become illusory and effectively nonexistent.
A. Enforcement Against Non-Contracting Parties
The inability to enforce CCAMLR against non-contracting
parties is a substantial threat to the effective management of
Antarctic fisheries. Consent to be bound governs the
enforceability of treaties against States. 150 States consenting to a
treaty are the only States against which the treaty can be
enforced, unless the treaty has become part of customary
international law. 151 CCAMLR has yet to be accepted as
customary international law. As a result, CCAMLR's provisions
and promulgated regulations, which advance a comprehensive
management regime for marine living resources, are only binding
and enforceable against party States.152 All non-party States,
under UNCLOS's high seas freedoms,153 have the right to exploit
the Southern Ocean's marine living resources in manners
inconsistent with, or even in contravention of, CCAMLR. The
jurisdictional deficiency of CCAMLR prevents CCAMLR and its
promulgated regulations from being enforced against non-party
States thereby reducing the effectiveness of CCAMLR and its
management regime. With only a portion of commercial fishery
participants bound by CCAMLR and its regulations, CCAMLR's
ability to achieve effective management of Antarctica's marine
living resources is significantly limited.
150. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, at art. 34; Bender, supra note 13,
at 246.
151. Vienna Convention, supra note 46, at art. 38. See also Madsen, supra
note 51, at 470. Customary international law is different from international
law developed by treaty in that it generally is not expressly written down.
See Bender, supra note 99, at 238. Customary international law is developed
by "evidence of State practice supporting the custom and evidence that States
have an intention to be legally bound by the custom (i.e. opinio juris)." Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 102(2)-(103)
(1987). One State's practice of a custom becomes customary international
law only when a significant number of States also observe and consent to be
bound by the custom. See Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary
International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119, 132-34 (2007).
152. Assuming the opt-out clause is not utilized as previously discussed.
See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
153. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 87.
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B. Flags of Convenience
The prevalence of fishing vessels operating under flags of
convenience is another substantial problem for fisheries
management in the Southern Ocean. A flag of convenience is a
foreign flag under which a vessel is registered for purposes of
reducing operational costs.154 Generally, the nationality of the
vessel owner is different from the State in which the vessel is
registered.155 All vessels are required to be registered in the State
under whose flag they sail. 156 Once registered, the flag denotes
the laws of the State the vessel is operating under, which will
apply in the event of an admiralty case. 157 Thus, the vessel must
comply with both the domestic laws of the flag State as well as
with any international agreements to which the flag State is a
party. Outside the territorial seas, the jurisdiction of the flag
State is supreme, especially on the high seas, and the ability of
non-flag States to enforce either domestic or international treaty
regulations is severely limited,158 and in the case of the high seas,
practically non-existent.159
Under flags of convenience, vessels are allowed to "fish with
impunity in area(s) subject to conservation measures," as they are
not bound under international law due to the flag State's non-
party status.160  With the entire Southern Ocean from
Antarctica's coastline seaward classified as high seas, CCAMLR's
effectiveness is severely limited by vessels' ability to undermine
its fishery management regime through the use of flags of
154. See Bimal Patel, A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability - The
History and Future of Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States
Aviation Industry, 73 J. AIR L. & CoM. 487, 519 (2008).
155. See Francis C. Nolen, III, Vessel Financing Issues, C931 A.L.I.-A.B.A
187, 190 (1994).
156. See id. at 189.
157. See Laurence Blakely, Comment, The End of the Viarsa Saga and the
Legality of Australia's Vessel Forfeiture Penalty of Illegal Fishing in its
Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 677, 680 (2008).
158. Past the territorial sea, coastal states can only enforce regulations for
violations of the rights reserved to them under UNCLOS. See generally
UNCLOS, supra note 5.
159. Blakely, supra note 157, at 680.
160. See Ashley Lillian Erickson, Comment, Out of Stock: Strengthening
International Fishery Regulations to Achieve a Healthier Ocean, 34 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 281, 294 (2008).
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convenience. 161 Flags of convenience also allow vessel owners of
Contracting Parties to circumvent CCAMLR's conservation
measures. Since a vessel's nationality relates to its flag and not
the nationality of its owner, vessels engaging in commercial
fishing in the Southern Ocean may be flagged under States not
party to CCAMLR. The disconnect between the nationality of the
vessel and that of the vessel owner provides a mechanism for
bypassing compliance with CCAMLR's conservation measures. 162
IV. SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA
Enforceability of CCAMLR and its regulations is crucial in
ensuring an effective fisheries management regime in the
Southern Ocean. The lack of enforceability against non-party
States, an inherent quality of multilateral international
agreements, prevents CCAMLR's ecosystem-based management
regime from reaching the comprehensive level of regulation
necessary to attain CCAMLR's goal of protecting and preserving
the Antarctic environment. To achieve this goal, a system of
governance other then the Antarctic Treaty System may be
necessary. One which provides enforcement against all
participants in the commercial harvesting of Antarctica's marine
living resources regardless of vessel nationality. One solution is
the resolution of territorial claims and the establishment of
sovereignty in Antarctica.
A. Sovereignty in the Context of Fisheries Management
Establishing sovereignty in Antarctica would assist in
161. See Budislav Vukas & Davor Vidas, Flags of Convenience and High
Seas Fishing: The Emergence of a Legal Framework, in GOVERNING HIGH SEAS
FISHERIES THE INTERPLAY OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGIMES 53, 56-57 (Olav
Schram Stokke ed., 2001).
162. Baird, supra note 11, at 180 (stating that some vessels flying under
the flags of Panama and Belize, known flags of convenience, are thought to be
Argentinean vessels, and that Argentina is a party to both the Antarctic
Treaty and CCAMLR). For an example of the utilization of flags of
convenience for non-fisheries reasons see Stephen Thomas, Jr., State
Regulation of Cruise Ship Pollution: Alaska's Commercial Passenger Vessel
Compliance Program as a Model for Florida, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L & POL'Y 533,
540 (2004) (discussing how all major cruise lines, Carnival, Royal Caribbean,
Star Cruise, Norwegian Cruise Lines and Orient Line, register their ships
with flags of convenience).
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alleviating some of the problems currently plaguing fisheries
management in the Southern Ocean, primarily through the
creation of an EEZ. As previously discussed, territorial
sovereignty is a necessary predicate for the establishment of
sovereign rights over water space adjacent to a coastal State. 163
Once established, the coastal State has exclusive rights over
exploitation and exploration of resources, both living and non-
living, within the EEZ. 164 Those resources, while located in the
EEZ, become the property of the coastal State, which is charged
with their management.
One author suggests that actual territorial sovereignty may
not be necessary for establishing an Antarctic EEZ.165 He reasons
that under the current structure of governance, the Antarctic
Treaty members, as a single entity, essentially assert absolute
control over Antarctica. 166  Their control over every type of
activity is tantamount to sovereignty, which allows the assertion
of a collective claim to an Antarctic EEZ and its associated rights.
Article 55 of UNCLOS defines an EEZ "as an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea,"167 which suggests a territorial sea
is necessary for establishing an EEZ. The relevant portions of
UNCLOS define a territorial sea as an extension of a coastal
State's sovereignty, 168 which presupposes the existence of a
coastal State. In light of the unresolved territorial claims, and the
refusal of most of the world to recognize those claims, it is unlikely
that Antarctica would be considered a State. Absent recognition
as a State, a claim for an Antarctic EEZ is unlikely to be sustained
under UNCLOS.
Resolving the issue of sovereignty in Antarctica would
establish the necessary territorial claim for the creation of an
EEZ. The creation of a separate and independent Antarctic State
would trigger the creation of an EEZ which would establish a 200
nm buffer around the continent, 16 9 essentially withdrawing a
swath of adjacent ocean space from what is currently considered
163. See supra Part III.
164. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 56.
165. See Bergin, supra note 69, at 35-36.
166. Id.
167. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 55.
168. See id. at art. 2.
169. Id. at art. 57.
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the high seas. The breadth of Antarctica's EEZ would not
encompass the entire Southern Ocean nor would it correspond to
CCAMLR's present geographical extent. Rather, the creation of
an EEZ would place the first 200 nm of ocean space seaward of
Antarctica's coastline under a separate management regime
created and administered by the Antarctic State.170
Article 56 of UNCLOS would vest the exclusive sovereign
rights of "exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living" in the Antarctic
State. 171  The resources within the EEZ would become the
property of Antarctica, and the management thereof would
become the exclusive province of the Antarctic State. The
Antarctic State, not an international agreement, would dictate the
conditions under which harvesting of fish stocks could take place,
including: gear restrictions, the timing of the seasons, area
accessibility, catch limits, and licensing requirements.
Sovereignty in Antarctica and the resulting EEZ would create
the opportunity for an intensity in fishery regulation that has
been absent in the Southern Ocean. No longer would the entire
Southern Ocean be open to fishing, subject only to voluntary
management measures. Instead, compliance with management
measures would be mandatory within the Antarctic EEZ.
Additionally, enforcement ability would no longer be predicated on
whether a State is party to CCAMLR. Resources within the EEZ
would be the property of the Antarctic State and as such vessels
fishing in the EEZ would be subject to compliance with
promulgated fishery management measures as well as boarding,
arrest and/or monetary fine.
Notwithstanding the creation of sovereignty in Antarctica,
international instruments currently governing marine living
resources in the Southern Ocean, such as CCAMLR and the Seals
Convention, would still be applicable. Although the Antarctic
State would have authority to create its own management regime,
it could incorporate present international agreements, such as
CCAMLR and the Seals Convention, into its domestic law.
Incorporation of international treaties into the official
management regime of the Antarctic State would require the
170. See id. at art. 56-57.
171. Id. at art. 56.
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passage of legislation for the express purpose of domestic
implementation of treaty provisions. 172  Under this scenario,
compliance with CCAMLR and the Seals Convention would be
mandatory within the EEZ; all States authorized to fish within
the EEZ would be required to comply with CCAMLR, the Seals
Convention and the regulations promulgated under both.173
Retaining CCAMLR, in particular, would provide the Antarctic
State with a readymade management regime; it has been
operational for nearly thirty years, adjusted over time to
compensate for various problems and shortcomings, and has been
relatively successful given the inherent limitations of
international agreements. Changes would be necessary to tailor
CCAMLR to the specific needs and goals of the Antarctic State,
such as developing a vessel authorization scheme to license
vessels to fish in the Antarctic EEZ. However, CCAMLR would
remain substantively the same.
Additionally, the adoption of CCAMLR as part of Antarctica's
domestic law would eliminate the problems of treaty enforcement
against non-contracting parties and flags of convenience that
currently plague CCAMLR's enforcement ability on the high
seas. 174 Within the EEZ, enforcement of regulations promulgated
under CCAMLR would be possible against all vessels engaging in
fishing, regardless of the State flag under which they sail. 175
B. Sovereignty in Antarctica: A Territorial Regime?
Legitimacy is crucial for the establishment of sovereignty in
Antarctica. Without legitimacy, other States will not recognize
any fisheries management regime established by Antarctica and
will continue to fish with impunity in the Southern Ocean. With
international legitimacy a necessary requirement for a recognized
Antarctic State, territorial sovereignty under the control of one of
more existing States would be unacceptable. Seven States have
already staked territorial claims to Antarctica, with three other
172. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret
International Law, 118 YALE L. J. 1762, 1810 (2009) (discussing the power of
Congress to enact domestic law to implement international treaty provisions).
173. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 56.
174. See supra Part III and accompanying sources.
175. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 56.
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States reserving that right.176 Once discussion of Antarctica's
sovereignty begins, States will likely defend their claims as
vigorously as they did during the Antarctic Treaty negotiations. 177
It is doubtful that any State will concede its territorial claim,
making single State control over Antarctica by an existing State
unlikely.
Similar opposition would be forthcoming to a territorial
regime utilizing the sector approach, which would divide
Antarctica into mini-sovereigns. Divvying up Antarctica would
raise a number of fundamental questions; namely, who is entitled
to a portion of Antarctica. Theoretically, every internationally
recognized State could claim a portion of Antarctica. Division of
Antarctica among every internationally recognized State would
result in each State receiving 71,795 km2 ;178 a piece roughly the
size of Sierra Leone. 179
Situating 195 States on one continent will lead to some
practical problems, one of which is access. Depending on the
geographical configuration of each Antarctic mini-sovereign, a
considerable number of States may be landlocked. Due to the
nature of landlocked States, cooperation from other States would
be necessary in order to obtain access to their portion of
Antarctica. Antarctica's land mass is not homogenous. Each
portion of Antarctica would contain different land features and
176. The seven States having claimed portions of Antarctica are
Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United
Kingdom. See ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 28. In addition, Japan, USSR (now
Russia) and the United States have reserved the right to make claims. Id. at
27-28.
177. Even after the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, sovereignty continues
to be disputed. One example is the Falkland War of 1982, which involved a
dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of
two sub-Antarctic islands, Falkland Island and South Georgia. See Nina M.
Serafino, Historical Setting, in PERSPECTIVES ON NEGOTIATION FOUR CASE
STUDIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 54, 56-57 (Diane B. Bendahmane & John W.
McDonald, Jr. eds., 1986). Following the two months of conflict, Argentina
surrendered to the United Kingdom. Id. at 57. Argentina, however, still
maintains its claim to sovereignty over the two islands. Id. at 59.
178. VICTOR PRESCOTT and CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 531 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that the area of
continental Antarctica is approximately 14 million km2). Area of
Antarctica/total number of States = 71,795 km.
179. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 17 (expand the "Geography" menu)
(last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
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different possibilities for resource exploitation. Consequently, the
process by which States obtain a portion of Antarctica is
important as it will define a State's right to various resources as
well as its ability to access them. There are an infinite number of
processes by which States could be assigned a portion of
Antarctica. A lottery, where each State is drawn at random and
assigned a portion of Antarctica seems the most fair, as it
eliminates favoritism. Potential drawbacks to this approach
include increased political tension from hostile States being
situated next to each other.
Dividing Antarctica among 195 States would defeat the
purpose behind establishing sovereignty. The purpose behind
resolving sovereignty in Antarctica is to enable a stronger
management regime for Antarctica's marine living resources.
Fracturing Antarctica into 195 different States would weaken the
management regime not strengthen it. Rather than a unified
circumpolar EEZ, several smaller EEZs would exist, potentially
195, if each State retained a pie-shaped slice of Antarctica. The
creation of 195 EEZs would make cohesive management of
Antarctica's marine ecosystem nearly impossible. Not only would
the myriad of fishing regulations make compliance impractical, it
would make the preservation of Antarctica's marine living
resources impractical as well, given that 195 States would need to
agree on various fishing regulations in order to prevent
commercial fish stocks from overfishing and collapse.
In order to maintain CCAMLR's goal of protecting and
preserving Antarctica's marine living resources Antarctica would
have to be divided among a significantly smaller number of States.
This would reduce the number of different fishing regulations
vessels must comply with and increase the probability of
cooperation among States towards the preservation and
sustainable management of marine living resources.
Assuming agreement to divide Antarctica among a select
number of States, the issue becomes how many and which States.
If the division of Antarctica is limited to the twelve original
signatories 180 of the Antarctic Treaty, then the issue of competing
180. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (now Russia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. See Antarctic Treaty,
SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA
territorial claims, a major issue behind the negotiation of the
Antarctic Treaty, resurfaces. 181 Of the twelve original signatories,
only seven have made claims, three of which overlap, 182 three
States have reserved the right to make claims1 83 and the
remaining two States have not made or reserved the right to make
claims. 184 With outstanding territorial claims from five States, it
is likely that once all claims are made, more claims will overlap.
In light of the inability to resolve Antarctica's territorial disputes
in 1959, it seems likely that resolution of territorial claims will not
be forthcoming anytime soon.
Regardless of the number of States claiming a portion of
Antarctica a selection process is needed. Developing a selection
process acceptable to a majority of States would be nearly
impossible, as inevitably, some State or group of States would
take issue with the process 185  Considering the practical
challenges that exist in dividing Antarctica between existing
States and the disincentive such a division would create in
managing Antarctica as a collective unit, a regime predicated on
multiple, individual State ownership is likely undesirable.
C. World Governance in Antarctica
World governance is the only type of governance likely to
avoid an international upheaval and, at the same time, maintain
the level of conservation that Antarctica and its 'ecosystem
desperately need. An international regime would, theoretically,
involve participation from all States in the management of
Antarctica. This would alleviate the developing world's concern
supra note 1.
181. See supra Part II(A) and accompanying sources.
182. See supra note 176. The territorial claims of Argentina, Chile and
the United Kingdom overlap to some degree. See ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 28.
183. Supra note 176.
184. Belgium and South Africa are the only two States of the original
signatories to the Antarctic Treaty that have neither made territorial claims
in Antarctica or reserved the right to do so.
185. Given the stance of the developing States it is unlikely that they will
support any process which does not allow them some degree of access to
Antarctica and its resources. See, e.g., Bergin, supra note 69, at 32 (quoting
the Sri Lanka Ambassador as saying "[t]here are still areas of this planet
where opportunities remain for constructive and peaceful cooperation . . . for
the common good of all rather than the benefit of a few" . . . "such an area is
the Antarctic continent").
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about participation based on wealth and resource allocation, as
developing States would be entitled to participate in discussions
concerning the management of Antarctica.
The concept of international governance of Antarctica is
nothing new. In the 1940s, prior to Antarctic Treaty negotiation,
when the idea of managing Antarctica was in its infancy, several
forms of international governance were proposed for Antarctica,
including a United Nations trustee-ship and a condominium
regime,186 both of which were rejected. 187 The most recent regime
proposed by the developing world is the "common heritage of
mankind" or res communis concept. 188 Under this regime, all
existing territorial claims to Antarctica would be annulled, and
international sovereignty would be established with the express
purpose of managing resource exploitation for the benefit and use
of all States. 189
Adherents to the Antarctic Treaty are naturally hostile
towards any proposal changing the current regime, especially
those resulting in the forfeiture of territorial claims. In the words
of one author, "Sovereignty is real. It remains real,
notwithstanding the fact that other states do not acknowledge
that it is validly exercised; and it would be quite unrealistic to
entertain the belief that sovereignty will be abandoned either in
form or in substance." 190 Thus, a proposal for world governance of
Antarctica, in any form, would likely meet severe resistance as it
would require certain States to relinquish the control they
currently enjoy over Antarctica.
An international regime combining aspects of the existing
management regime under the Antarctic Treaty System and a
"common heritage of mankind" regime would establish a more
186. Trustee-ship is a regime where an entity manages a territory for the
benefit of all. See Bergin, supra note 69, at 30-31. A condominium regime is
one where territory is owned or managed by two or more States. Id. at 29. In
the case of Antarctica, a permanent secretariat and a full legal personality
were proposed. See id. at 32.
187. ELLIOT, supra note 65, at 28-29.
188. See id. at 47.
189. Bergin, supra note 69, at 31.
190. Keith Brennan, Criteria for access to the resources of Antarctica:
alternatives, procedure and experience applicable, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES
POLICY: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 218 (Franciso Orrego Vicuna
ed., 1983).
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integrated regime with greater enforceability against all States.
Incorporating the concept of international entitlement would
finally resolve the issue of territorial ownership. By recognizing
Antarctica as a benefit for all, and not solely a privilege for a few
wealthy States, the developing States' primary objection to the
current Antarctic regime, the exclusion of developing States from
access to Antarctica's resources, would be neutralized. Under an
international regime, developing States would receive access to a
forum and the opportunity to be heard regarding their agenda for
Antarctic management.191
Global recognition of international ownership of Antarctica
would extinguish all individual claims to Antarctica and establish
international sovereignty over the continent. Under the proposed
international regime, the main principles enumerated in the
Antarctic Treaty would still apply, namely the use of Antarctica
for scientific and peaceful purposes and the continued
demilitarization of Antarctica.192  In light of the focus on
Antarctica's resources as relief from the developing resource
shortage, activities on the Antarctic continent should be limited to
only scientific endeavors. The contention over sovereignty in
Antarctica stems from the fact that sovereignty defines ownership
to the entire vertical column (subsoil, land and air) and the
resources contained therein. Foreclosing the ability to exploit
resources, at least with respect to resources located on the
continent and the seabed/continental shelf, would prevent any one
State from being unfairly advantaged. It would also eliminate the
problem of resource allocation; deciding how resources belonging
to the international community should be apportioned among
individual States.
Specific revisions to the Antarctic Treaty should include
narrowing the use of Antarctica to only scientific purposes,
expressly excluding the exploitation of resources located on the
continent, in the seabed and on the continental shelf. Exploitation
of marine living resources should be permitted and executed
191. These ideas are part of why the United States has been successful
and admired. See, e.g., DINESH D'SOUZA, WHAT's So GREAT ABOUT AMERICA,
64-65 (discussing the success and appeal of American democracy: "Democracy
is based on a broad human aspiration: the aspiration to be heard and to
participate in decision-making.").
192. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. I, art. II, art. V.
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under the current international instruments: CCAMLR and the
Seals Convention, with whaling regulated by the International
Whaling Commission (IWC). Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty
should be changed to eliminate the requirement reserving voting
rights to only those States with "substantial scientific research
activity" and the remaining articles modified to reflect the
change. 193 With an increased number of States entitled to voting
rights, adoption of measures should no longer be by consensus, but
rather by a three-fourths majority. 194 As previously mentioned,
CCAMLR and the Seals Convention should remain in force as the
management regime for Antarctic marine living resources.
Territorial sovereignty, having been established in an
international body, would permit the extension of jurisdiction to
the adjacent water space allowing the assertion of a 200 nm EEZ.
As a result, compliance with CCAMLR and the Seals Convention
would be mandatory and enforceable against all States in the EEZ
and against party States on the high seas. 195
V. PROBLEMS WITH SOVEREIGNTY IN ANTARCTICA BASELINE
DELINEATION
Regardless of the form sovereignty in Antarctica takes, in
order to discern the geographical breadth of the EEZ, the
baselines of the continent must be delineated. Baselines are the
193. See id., at art. IX.
194. The author has not considered the exact standard by which measures
would be passed, but suggests that it be something less then consensus and
something more than simple majority. A facet of the system would be its
ability to facilitate compromise and negotiation while also implementing
agreements in the face of resistance by only a few members. While consensus
is ideal, it would not be practical for an effective management regime with a
goal of conservation of Antarctica. See, e.g., supra note 81, (discussing India
blocking every measure since it received voting rights).
195. The creation of an Antarctic State complete with sovereignty and
administered by the international community as proposed in this Comment
stretches the bounds of the concept of traditional sovereignty. Traditional
sovereignty generally requires a human component, the governed, in order
for sovereignty to attach. Antarctica is devoid of natural human inhabitants
and thus the creation of a legal fiction which recognizes sovereignty despite
the absence of a native population is necessary for the establishment of an
Antarctic State and a system of governance as proposed in this Comment. An
in-depth discussion of the creation of an Antarctic State and its relation to
the concept of traditional sovereignty is beyond the scope of this Comment
and the author welcomes examination of this issue.
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starting point from which UNCLOS zones of jurisdiction are
measured. 196 Generally, baselines are measured from the low-
water mark, but UNCLOS has several provisions regarding the
intricacies of baseline delineation. 197
Baseline delineation of Antarctica is problematic due to the
uncertainty surrounding the legal identity of ice shelves. 198
Currently, ice shelves have yet to be accorded any legal identity
with respect to baseline delineation.199 Antarctica is a continent
whose boundaries are extended by ice shelves that have been in
existence for centuries. Deciding whether ice shelves are included
in delineating Antarctica's baselines will have a significant impact
on the location of the outer EEZ boundary. As a result of the
permanence and durability of ice shelves, a persuasive argument
exists for their inclusion as baselines. 200 Yet, the reality remains
that both ice calving201 and the recent phenomenon of climate
change inhibit the permanence of ice shelves, and thus may
prevent their use as stable baselines. 202
Another fundamental problem with using ice shelves as
baselines is the variability of their seaward extent. The breadth of
ice shelves varies with the seasons; to a greater extent in winter
and a shorter extent in summer.203 Thus, assuming Antarctica's
ice shelves have sufficient permanence to be included as baselines,
the question remains at what point in the year should ice shelf
extent be indicative of Antarctica's baselines. The author suggests
that the historical average of the ice shelves should be used as the
baseline from which the UNCLOS zones of jurisdiction are
measured. 204 This average baseline takes into account ice shelf
196. UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 3 (breadth of territorial sea), art. 33
(breadth of contiguous zone), art. 48 (breadth of ocean zone with regard to
Archipelagic States), and art. 57 (breadth of EEZ).
197. Id. at art. 5-16.
198. Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law, 31
NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 229 (1991).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ice calving is the breaking off of a piece of ice from its parent glacier,
iceberg or ice shelf. See United States Geological Survey (USGS), Glossary,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/ofl2004/1216/c/c.html (Calving) (last visited Dec. 22,
2009).
202. See Joyner, supra note 198, at 229.
203. Id.
204. For a more in-depth analysis of the delineation of baselines in polar
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variation over time and seasons.
A. Vessel Permitting System
Another problem with establishing sovereignty in Antarctica
is the development of a vessel permitting system for those vessels
allowed to harvest marine living resources within the EEZ. Once
sovereignty and the EEZ have been established, the resources
within the EEZ would become the property of Antarctica. Only its
nationals and any vessels permitted would have the right to
exploit resources, and then only under the rules and regulations
promulgated by Antarctica. 205 Antarctica, being devoid of natural
human inhabitants, has no permanent population, thus any
harvesting of resources would be through the express consent of
the Antarctic sovereign. Consequently, some type of permitting
system would need to be developed, through which specific vessels
would be entitled to exploit the resources in Antarctica's EEZ.
B. Enforcement of CCAMLR within the EEZ
A primary reason behind establishing sovereignty in
Antarctica is the ability to claim an EEZ-to effectively close off a
200 nm zone of ocean space surrounding Antarctica. Establishing
an EEZ grants the Antarctic sovereign the ability to exclude other
States from exploiting resources in the EEZ, however, the ability
to exclude is only as good as the means available to enforce it.
Success in providing stringent protection for Antarctica's marine
living resources will hinge on a robust enforcement of CCAMLR
within the EEZ. Currently, member States are the only bodies
able to enforce CCAMLR.206 An international sovereign entity,
taking over enforcement of CCAMLR lacks its own independent
naval forces at its disposal to patrol against IUU fishing and other
violations. Accordingly, authorization to enforce CCAMLR
measures against vessels within the EEZ, at least in the
beginning, will need to be granted to the naval forces of various
States. The costs associated with having States' naval forces
regions, see Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law,
in ANTARCTIc LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 10,
229-231 (Gillian Triggs & Anna Riddell eds., 2007).
205. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, at art. 56.
206. CCAMLR, supra note 10, at art. IX (discussing the implementation of
convention measures by member States).
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patrol the EEZ, or the creation of Antarctica's own enforcement
fleet, could be calculated into the cost of a fishing permit.
CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the effects establishing sovereignty
in Antarctica would have with regard to marine living resources.
The lack of sovereignty in Antarctica has resulted in the
designation of the Southern Ocean in its entirety as high seas,
precluding strict enforcement of CCAMLR, the current
international instrument regulating fishery resources in the
Southern Ocean. Establishing Antarctica as its own sovereign
would, in the case of fisheries management, enable the creation of
a circum-continental EEZ providing for enforcement of CCAMLR
regulations against any violating vessel, regardless of the vessel's
nationality.
The resolution of sovereignty in Antarctica is a contentious
issue that will undoubtedly trigger dispute within the
international community. A form of world governance
incorporating the principle of international ownership over
Antarctica and its resources holds the most promise for replacing
the current management regime. Restricting the use of Antarctica
to scientific purposes and preventing exploitation of territorial,
seabed and continental shelf resources will reduce the magnitude
of the international dispute by eliminating the problem of
allocating resources among individual States.
An important limitation of this Comment, having more to do
with the scope of this Comment than as a consequence of
establishing sovereignty, is the effect an international regime
would have on territorial, seabed and continental shelf resource
exploration and exploitation. This Comment specifically
addresses the benefits and consequences of a sovereign Antarctica
in the context of fisheries management. Any change in the
current management regime must evaluate the benefits of the
proposed regime in terms of its effects on all aspects of Antarctic
management rather than just the subset focused on within this
Comment. This Comment only seeks to illustrate the effect of
sovereignty, or the lack thereof, on the ability to manage fishery
resources in the Southern Ocean. The author welcomes others to
examine the effects an international regime, such as the one
proposed in this Comment, would have with regard to other
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resource exploration and exploitation not specifically addressed.
As one expert pointed out over thirty years ago, Antarctica
remains the last, great, unspoiled region on Earth: "any delay in
taking immediate action toward a new, internationally
acknowledged legal ordering of Antarctica will only make
resolution of the ... resource problem more difficult to achieve." 207
As natural resources become increasingly scarce, any further
delay could indeed lead to the very destruction of Antarctica.
207. Frank C. Alexander, Jr., A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic
Resource Problem, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371, 402 (1978).
